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Following the massacre at Orlando’s Pulse nightclub, a year ago this 
June, more attention has been paid to the frequency with which domestic 
violence precedes gun violence.1 Yet while this better understanding of civilian 
																																								 																				
* Frederick Sheldon Fellow at the Center for Law, Justice, and Society (Dejusticia). 
 
1 See, e.g., Soroya Chemaly, In Orlando, as Usual, Domestic Violence Was Ignored Red 
Flag, ROLLING STONE (June 13, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/in-or 
lando-as-usual-domestic-violence-was-ignored-red-flag-20160613 (“Intimate partner violence 
and the toxic masculinity that fuels it are the canaries in the coal mine for understanding 
public terror, and yet this connection continues largely to be ignored, to everyone's 
endangerment . . . . [I]t’s time to correlate the known risk factors for intimate partner killing,  
 




gun violence gains traction, the correlations between domestic violence and 
excessive force by police officers remains relatively unexplored.2 
In the United States, studies suggest that rates of police officer-
involved domestic violence (OIDV) are at 40%, which is significantly higher 
than the national average.3 Additionally, 41% of responding male officers 
admitted to at least one incident of physical aggression against their spouse 
during the previous year, and 8% of those admitted to “severe” physical 
aggression including choking, strangling, and the use or threatened use of a 
knife or gun.4 
Police officers also have unique access to potential victims; “[t]hey have 
training, a badge, a gun and the weight of the police culture behind them.”5 
Police officers are taught how to restrain and subdue without causing injuries 
that are easily observable; they know how and where to hit a partner in a way 
																																								 																				
determined in what is known as a lethality assessment, to other factors that might help predict 
who will engage in acts of mass shooting and killing.”). 
2 This paper uses the term “domestic violence” because courts do so, but the term has various 
shortcomings. For discussions of the term’s limitations, see NICOLA GROVES & TERRY TOMAS, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-11 (2013); and for discussions of the word term 
“victim” to describe those who suffer domestic violence, see Bonita C. Meyersfeld, Reconcep-
tualizing Domestic Violence in International Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 371, 379-80 (2003). 
 
“A common question is whether the term ‘victim’ or the term ‘survivor’ 
should be used when referring to a woman who suffers abuse. A concern is 
that the word ‘victim’ imposes on women a pernicious perception of weakness 
and vulnerability, which perpetuates the subjugated status inherent within 
domestic violence. On the other hand, the word ‘survivor’ is problematic in its 
implied commentary on those women who either kill or are killed as a result 
of the abuse. . . . I choose to refer to women in domestic violence situations as 
victims and to the process of harm as victimization. In no way is the term 
‘victim’ used to suggest inferiority or weakness.” 
 
Id. 
3 Shiho Yamamoto & Harvey Wallace, Domestic Violence By Law Enforcement Officers, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 255, 255-56 (Nicky Ali Jackson ed., 2007); see also 
Peter H. Neidig, Harold E. Russell, & Albert F. Seng, Interspousal Aggression in Law 
Enforcement Families: A Preliminary Investigation, 15 POLICE STUD.: INT’L REV. POLICE 
DEV. 30, 37 (1992) (“40% of the officers surveyed report at least one episode of physical 
aggression during a marital conflict in the previous year . . .”); Philip M. Stinson & John 
Liederbach, Fox in the Henhouse: A Study of Police Officers Arrested for Crimes Associated 
with Intimate Partner and/or Family Violence, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 601, 605 (2013) 
(internal citation omitted) (“40% of responding officers admitted that they had behaved 
violently toward their spouse at least once during the previous six months.”). 
4 Neidig, Russell, & Seng, supra note 3, at 31 tbl. 2. 
5 Diane Wetendorf, The Impact of Police-Perpetrated Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE BY POLICE OFFICERS 375, 376 (Donald C. Sheehan ed., 2000).  




that will not leave visible bruises so that when a victim reports an injury she 
will often not have physical supporting evidence.6 Moreover, officer abusers 
know the locations of domestic violence shelters and may have experience that 
can be used to manipulate government systems.7 
A particular advantage that police officers have is a “code of silence” 
behind a “blue wall,” the protection of their fellow officers should a complain-
ant come forward.8 The code of silence “is an unofficial acknowledgment that 
no officer blames or implicates another officer who is accused of a wrong-
doing.”9 Officers face life-and-death situations together, resulting in a culture 
of solidarity and loyalty among the officers that leads to the unspoken “code of 
silence.”10 The “code of silence” discourages reporting against officers by 
other police officers (and their families), who are all expected to protect the 
brotherhood rather than “blow the whistle” on officer perpetrators.11 
Most victims of domestic violence are women,12 who are economically 
disadvantaged compared with men in the United States.13 The police culture  
of extreme loyalty often leads officers to convince a victim of OIDV that  
she would be economically better off if she did not cause her husband to lose 
his job on the force;14 sometimes she is even convinced to recant previous 
																																								 																				
6 Jacqueline M. Mazzola, Honey, I'm Home: Addressing the Problem of Officer Domestic 
Violence, 27 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 347, 351 (2014).  
7 See Maureen O’Hagan & Cheryl Phillips, The Brame Case: When a Wife’s Abuser is a 
Cop, Who Can Help?, SEATTLE TIMES (May 9, 2003), http://community.seattletimes.nw 
source.com/archive/?date=20030509&slug=dv09m0 (explaining the ways in which abusive 
police officers can use their knowledge of the system to discredit claims made by battered 
spouses); DIANE WETENDORF, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, WHEN THE 
BATTERER IS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER: A GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 8 (2004) (“An 
officer . . . knows the locations of local shelters and can readily discover the address of any 
shelter. By training and profession, police have investigative skills and access to many types 
of information, making it possible for the abuser to track the victim or obtain and use personal 
information against the victim and her family and friends.”) 
8 Karen Oehme et al., Protecting Lives, Careers, and Public Confidence: Florida's Efforts to 
Prevent Officer-Involved Domestic Violence, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 84, 87 (2011). 
9 Yamamoto & Wallace, supra note 3, at 258. 
10 Id. 
11 Stinson & Liederbach, supra note 3, at 605. 
12 CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 1 (2000). 
13 This trend cuts across all racial and ethnic groups. ALEXANDRA CAWTHORNE, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS, THE STRAIGHT FACTS ON WOMEN IN POVERTY 1 (2008), https://cdn.amer 
icanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2008/10/pdf/women_poverty.pdf. 
14 Kevin Fagan, Police Domestic Violence Nearly Twice Average Rate, SFGATE (Jan. 15, 
2012), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Police-domestic-violence-nearly-twice-avera 
ge-rate-2536928.php (citing interview with Diane Wetendorf, author of WHEN THE 
BATTERER IS A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER: A GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES, supra note 7). 




statements to cover up domestic violence allegations.15 According to the Inde-
pendent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, the code of 
silence constitutes “the greatest single barrier to the effective investigation and 
adjudication of complaints against police officers.”16 
This has a disproportionate impact on women of color, who already 
face additional challenges associated with reporting assaults. Prevailing sexist 
and racist attitudes make women of color particularly vulnerable to sexual 
violence and access to justice particularly difficult for them.17 Many people of 
color are also particularly reluctant to rely on the aid of other police officers, 
as police departments have traditionally been viewed as oppressive of 
minorities and immigrants, rather than a source of protection.18 
																																								 																				
15 See Donna Tam, Experts Say Victims Often Recant Out of Fear, Love, TIMES STANDARD 
(Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.times-standard.com/general-news/20080814/experts-say-vic 
tims-often-recant-out-of-fear-love (“[I]t’s not uncommon for victims to change their mind 
on pressing charges, or reinterpreting what they’ve said . . . . [V]ictims of domestic violence 
change their testimony, or recant, for different reasons.”); Lillian Lao, Domestic Violence 
Victim Recants Statement – Experts Weigh In, WIAT 42 NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015), http://wiat. 
com/2015/04/01/domestic-violence-victim-recants-statement-experts-weigh-in/ (“[M]any diff-
erent types of pressure can contribute to why a victim might recant a statement Pressure can 
come from the offender in the relationship . . . .”). 
16 INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 
ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 168 (1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER 
COMMISSION REPORT]. 
17 “African American females experience intimate partner violence at a rate 35% higher than 
white females do, and at about 2.5 times the rate of women of other races; however, they are 
less likely than white women to use social services, utilize battered women’s programs, or 
go to the hospital because of domestic violence.” THE WOMEN OF COLOR NETWORK FACTS 
& STATS COLLECTION, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 2 (2006), http://w 
ww.doj.state.or.us/victims/pdf/women_of_color_network_facts_sexual_violence_2006.pdf. 
Id. “Stereotypes regarding African American women’s sexuality . . . perpetuate the notion 
that African American women are willing participants in their own victimization. However, 
these myths only serve to demean, obstruct appropriate legal remedies, and minimize the 
seriousness of sexual violence perpetuated against African American women.” Id.  
18 See generally Race, Trust and Police Legitimacy, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (July 14, 2016), 
https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/legitimacy/Pages/welcome.aspx (“Research consis-
tently shows that minorities are more likely than whites to view law enforcement with 
suspicion and distrust.”); ANITA KHASHU ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, BUILDING STRONG 
POLICE-IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY RELATIONS: LESSONS FROM A NEW YORK CITY PROJECT 2 
(2005) (“Research shows that immigrants’ attitudes towards the police are less positive than 
those of native-born citizens, and immigrants are less likely to imitate contact with police or 
report crimes.”); Jenny Rivera, An Equal Protection Standard for National Origin 
Subclassifications: The Context That Matters, 82 WASH. L. REV. 897, 920 fn. 91 (citing JOSE 
LUIS, LATINO/A RIGHTS AND JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 95-110 (2005)) (discussing 
Latino distrust of government and law enforcement, as evidenced by “community reactions 
to police brutality and anti-immigration legislation”). 




Police violence of another type has recently received well-deserved 
attention: the use of excessive or deadly force against criminal suspects, which 
is another shockingly common police practice.19 These two types of violence 
are rarely connected, and little research has been done into the likelihood that 
complaints of domestic violence can serve as predictors of on-the-job violence. 
Researchers believe OIDV constitutes a well-known phenomenon among 
police supervisors, yet it remains understudied because police departments 
seek to hide its prevalence.20 One study found that over one in five of the 
officers identified in as having committed OIDV were also named as 
defendants in federal court civil actions, suggesting a high correlation.21 
This article will explore the reasons to believe that violence on and off 
duty may be highly correlated, and the legal implications of that link. It also 
calls for further research to be done on the correlations.22 
 
																																								 																				
19 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and City of Cleveland 
Agree to Reform Division of Police After Finding a Pattern or Practice of Excessive Force 
(Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-city-cleveland-agree-
reform-division-police-after-finding-pattern-or (announcing the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice’s civil rights investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police and its finding that 
Cleveland police officers “engage in a pattern or practice of unreasonable and in some cases 
unnecessary force”); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, at 28-41 (2015), http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/doc 
uments/national/department-of-justice-report-on-the-ferguson-mo-police-department/1435/ 
(reporting on the U.S. Department of Justice’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Depart-
ment and its finding that Ferguson officers engage “in a pattern of excessive force in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment”); Police Use of Force, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Nov. 29, 2016), https:// 
www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/welcome.aspx (“[I]n 
large departments (those with 100 or more sworn officers), the complaint rate for police use 
of force was 6.6 complaints per 100 sworn officers.”). See generally GEOFFREY P. ALPERT 
& ROGER G. DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE USE OF FORCE: OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND 
RECIPROCITY (2004). Nonfatal force by police also poses a serious threat. Such force 
includes “shouting, cursing, threatening force, pushing or grabbing, hitting or kicking, using 
pepper spray, using an electroshock weapon, pointing a gun, or using other force.” U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, POLICE USE OF NONFATAL FORCE, 2002–
11 1 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/punf0211_sum.pdf. “The levels, or conti-
nuum, of force police use include basic verbal and physical restraint, less-lethal force, and 
lethal force.” Police Use of Force, supra note 19. 
20 Melissa J. Erwin, Robyn R. M. Gershon, Michael Tiburzi & Susan Lin, Reports of Intimate 
Partner Violence Made Against Police Officers, 20 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 13, 14 (2005) 
(citing Neidig, Russell & Seng, supra note 3). 
21 Stinson & Liederbach, supra note 3, at 615. 
22 Id. at 603 (“There are no comprehensive statistics available on OIDV, and no government 
entity collects data on the criminal conviction of police officers for crimes associated with 
domestic and/or family violence.”). 
 




I. TWO “SPHERES” OF VIOLENCE 
 
Historically, the dichotomy between public and private space was deli-
berately crafted to preserve men’s rule over their households.23 In the past 
several decades, women’s rights advocates have succeeded in pressuring states 
to dissolve the public-private distinction, such that many states have passed 
laws to respond to in-home violence.24 As states continued to address domestic 
violence, the boundaries between public and private have been challenged. 
Feminist legal theorists critiqued the public/private distinction, and feminist 
and non-feminist legal theorists suggested that the idea of “privacy” in and of 
itself is a social and legal construct.25 Women were traditionally relegated to 
the “private” sphere, and “raising the curtain” between the two constitutes a 
central goal of the domestic violence movement.26 
Yet the divide has remained, as evident in two infamous domestic 
violence cases. First, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services, the United States Supreme Court almost eliminated substantive due 
process as a viable remedy.27 The Supreme Court held that the Due Process 
Clause did not require Winnebago County Department of Social Services to 
protect five-year-old Joshua DeShaney from acts of violence committed by 
																																								 																				
23 See generally Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as a Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). 
24 See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1857-1860 (1996). 
25 See, e.g., id. (discussing issues with the public-private distinction in the context of its 
relationship with the criminal justice system’s goals and structures); Raia Prokhovnik, 
Public and Private Citizenship: From Gender Invisibility to Feminist Inclusiveness, 60 
FEMINIST REV. 84, 87-88 (1998) (discussing problems with the public/private distinction in 
the context of women’s choices); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 100 (1987) (“[T]here is no private, either normatively or 
empirically. Feminism confronts the fact that women have no privacy to lose or to 
guarantee.”); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 233-96 
(providing an examination of privacy as a social and legal construct outside of traditional 
feminist scholarship). 
26 Rebecca Green, Privacy and Domestic Violence in Court, 16 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 237, 242 (2010). 
27 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-98 (1989) 
(“[T]he Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens with particular 
protective services, [and thus] the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries 
that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them.”). In this case, after years of 
investigating reports of child abuse and medical evidence of a Joshua DeShaney’s repeated 
injuries, Winnebago County Department of Social Services nonetheless allowed the child to 
stay in his father’s care. Id. at 191-93. The father then beat five-year old Joshua so severely 
as to put him in a permanent, semi-vegetative state. Id. at 193. 
 




his father.28 Then, in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the Court almost 
eliminated remedy via procedural due process.29 In Castle Rock, the Court 
addressed a case in which the failure to enforce a restraining order resulted in 
the murder of a woman’s three children by her estranged husband.30 The 
Supreme Court held that the refusal to enforce the restraining order did not 
amount to a violation of a constitutional due process right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment,31 nor do victims of domestic violence have a property interest in 
the enforcement of their protective orders.32 
The sense that OIDV and excessive force are unrelated, one belonging 
in the private sphere and one in the public, also became apparent in two recent 
cases analyzed under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.33 In Ramirez-
Lluveras v. Rivera-Merced, the First Circuit held that domestic violence com-
plaints do not constitute a “known history of widespread abuse sufficient to alert 
a supervisor to ongoing violations,” which is needed to attach supervisory 
liability to a police officer’s excessive violence.34 Seven disciplinary complaints, 
including a series of domestic violence allegations (including one described in 
the official record as “[Officer Javier Pagán] attacked [the complainant] because 
he saw her talking with another officer and he threatened her with his regulation 
firearm”35) did not give notice that Officer Pagán presented a “substantial,” 
“unusually serious,” or “grave” risk.36 After the domestic violence complaint, 
the Puerto Rico Police Department Superintendent had released an initial 
disciplinary recommendation for termination of Officer Pagán's employment, 
but after a hearing several years later in which Officer Pagán denied the 
allegations, the Superintendent instead ordered a punishment of 60 days’ 
suspension without pay.37 
One year after returning from his two-month suspension, when Officer 
Pagán met with resistance from someone he was arresting for directing traffic 
																																								 																				
28 Id. at 197-203. The Court noted that, under the special relationship doctrine, if Joshua had 
been in state custody then the state may have been liable; but since Joshua was abused at 
home, Social Services was not liable. Id. at 190. 
29 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 766-69 (2005). 
30 Id. at 751-54. 
31 Id. at 764. 
32 Id. at 768; see also Mazzola, supra note 6, at 350 (discussing how Castle Rock severely 
limited the reach of § 1983 actions by eliminating the right to sue for a failure to arrest when 
a restraining order has been violated). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
34 Ramirez-Lluveras v. Rivera Merced, 759 F.3d 10, 20-23 (1st Cir. 2014) (citations 
omitted). 
35 Id. at 4-15. 
36 Id. at 21. 
37 Id. at 15. 




outside a quinceañero,38 he drew his gun and shot the victim multiple times in 
the back.39 After a pause, Pagán shot the victim one final time, this time in the 
head.40 In the § 1983 lawsuit by the victim’s wife and children, the Ramirez-
Lluveras court clarified, “[w]e disagree with the proposition that private 
domestic abuse is not relevant to the risk of an officer abusing his public position 
with violence,” yet with the immediate facts it held that the connection between 
the supervisor’s inaction and the resulting violation was too tenuous.41 The 
court’s reasoning included that Officer Pagán’s domestic violence complaints 
were nine years before the shooting, that he received the “significant discipline” 
of a sixty-day suspension without pay, and that “[a] reasonable official would 
think that suspension would have a deterrent effect.”42 
Similarly, in Saldivar v. Racine, the First Circuit affirmed a lower 
court’s ruling that eleven separate violations of on-the-job police misconduct, 
resulting in forty-one total days of suspension over five years, should not be 
expected to “put the City on notice” that an officer may attack and rape 
someone.43 Thus, the City’s failure to terminate the officer’s employment or to 
order him to undergo additional training and supervision did not amount to 
deliberate indifference.44 Indeed, the First Circuit held that such a complaint 
did not even “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”45 
 
II. URGENT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE “TWO SPHERES” 
 
The aforementioned cases seem to reflect the law’s traditional private/ 
public distinction, categorizing domestic violence and on-the-job violence as 
both distinct and barely connected, if connected at all.46 Yet social science 
																																								 																				
38 A quinceañero is a traditional party marking the rite of passage of girls turning fifteen. Id. 
at 13 n. 5. 
39 Id. at 13-14. 
40 Id. at 14. 
41 Id. at 21, 22-23. 
42 Id. at 21. 
43 Saldivar v. Pridgen, 91 F. Supp. 3d 134, 137-39 (D. Mass. 2015) aff’d Saldivar v. Racine, 
818 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2016). 
44 Id. 
45 Saldivar, 818 F.3d at 18-20 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
The First Circuit also stated that the fact that Officer Pridgen owned an illegal firearm was 
insignificant, while the connection between gun ownership and domestic violence has long 
been evident. For more on related studies, see generally Babak Lalezari, Domestic Violence: 
Enough is Enough, Any Force is Enough, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 295 (2008); Bethany A. Corbin, 
Goodbye Earl: Domestic Abusers and Guns in the Wake of United States v. Castleman-Can 
the Supreme Court Save Domestic Violence Victims?, 94 NEB. L. REV. 101 (2015). 
46 See generally Hanna, supra note 24. 




suggests that the “two spheres” both see violence resulting from stress and other 
consistent factors, thus violence in one “sphere” points to the factors like stress 
and authoritarianism that are likely to cause violence in the other.  
Much has been written about the general link between stress and 
health.47 Researchers have identified policing as “one of the most highly 
stressful jobs in North America.”48 Police officers are trained to see every 
interaction as potentially life threatening and to remain hyper-vigilant and 
ready to engage.49 Researchers studying police officers have found strong links 
between stress in officers’ lives and the propensity to commit excessive on-
the-job violence.50 Additionally, studies have established factors that 
exacerbate officer violence, factors that supervisors could track and decrease.51 
Studies on police officers’ use of force consistently find that a small percentage 
of officers are responsible for a relatively large proportion of use-of-force 
incidents.52 These studies also show that officers who frequently use force have 
certain common personal or situational characteristics.53 For example, research 
suggests that the location and type of patrol assignment impacts the use of 
force, with most use-of-force incidents occurring in high-crime areas.54 
																																								 																				
47 See, e.g., Anita DeLongis Susan Folkman & Richard S. Lazarus, The Impact of Daily 
Stress on Health and Mood: Psychological and Social Resources as Mediators, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 486, 492-94 (1988) (finding a statistically significant 
relationship between daily stressors and both concurrent and subsequent health issues in 
the selected sample). 
48 Oehme et al., supra note 8, at 93 (2011) (citing Michael Pendleton et al., Stress and Strain 
Among Police, Firefighters, and Government Workers: A Comparative Analysis, 16 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 196 (1989)). 
49 Seth W. Stoughton, Law Enforcement's "Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225, 
228 (2015). 
50 See, e.g., Patrik Manzoni & Manuel Eisner, Violence Between the Police and the Public: 
Influences of Work-Related Stress, Job Satisfaction, Burnout, and Situational Factors, 33 
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 613, 632 (“[I]t appears that police officers who used force more 
frequently also consistently reported higher levels of stress across a wide range of potential 
stress sources.”). 
51 See, e.g., Donald R. McCreary et al., The Law Enforcement Officer Stress Survey (LEOSS): 
Evaluation of Psychometric Properties, 32 BEHAV. MODIFICATION 133, 134-35 (2008) 
(discussing risk factors, such as “routine occupational stress,” that may contribute to police 
officers’ emotional instability). 
52 See, e.g., Steven G. Brandl & Meghan S. Stroshine, The Role of Officer Attributes, Job 
Characteristics, and Arrest Activity in Explaining Police Use of Force, 24 CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV. 551, 563 (2013) (“Of course, that a relatively small proportion of officers are 
responsible for a relatively large proportion of force incidents (and complaints) is a com-
mon finding in use-of-force research.” (internal citation omitted)). 
53 Id. at 552. 
54 Id. at 555-56. 
 




Dangerous incidents and other violence exposure constitute stressors 
highly correlated with excessive force and OIDV.55 There may be a higher 
proportion of suspects resisting arrest in high-crime areas, making use of force 
necessary more frequently.56 Yet studies show that police are more likely to 
employ force in higher-crime neighborhoods, higher-disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods, and predominately black neighborhoods, regardless of suspect behavior 
and other statistical controls.57 Unsurprisingly, studies have also found that police 
officers are much more likely to use excessive force against people of color.58 
Additionally, studies show that most use-of-force incidents occur 
during high-crime times of day.59 An officer’s shift (particularly shifts that 
cover the hours of 9:00 PM to 3:00 AM) may be related to the frequency with 
which officers use force.60 One study, which did not distinguish between 
“justified” and “excessive” force, found that among officers who use force, 
“high-rate” officers (those who were involved in three or more incidents in a 
certain year) are significantly more likely to be younger, to be male, to patrol 
higher crime areas, and to be assigned to certain shifts (3:00 PM to 11:00 PM 
																																								 																				
55 Erwin, et al., supra note 20, at 17-18; Stinson & Liederbach, supra note 3, at 603. 
Researchers have also hypothesized a relationship between OIDV and officer Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), but so far very little empirical data has been collected on this issue. 
56 See Kenneth Adams, What We Know About Police Use of Force, in THE USE OF FORCE 
BY POLICE 1, 5 (1999) (“[R]esistance by the public increases the likelihood that police will 
use force.”). 
57 Why Do US Police Keep Killing Unarmed Black Men?, BBC (May 26, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32740523 (citing GEORGE FACHNER & 
STEVEN CARTER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF DEADLY FORCE IN THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 30-33 
(2015)). The cited Department of Justice study reported that Philadelphia police officers 
were more likely to have incorrectly believed a Black person was armed than a white person 
(even if the police officer were Black or Latino). Id. Additionally, according to a ProPublica 
report, young black males are at 21 times greater risk of being killed by police offers than 
young white males, based on analysis of federally collected data. Ryan Gabrielson, Ryann 
Grochowski Jones, & Eric Sagara, Deadly Force, in Black and White, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 
2014), http://www.propublica.org/article/deadly- force-in-black-and-white.  
58 See, e.g., Karen F. Parker, John M. MacDonald, Wesley G. Jennings & Geoffrey P. Alpert, 
Racial Threat, Urban Conditions and Police Use of Force: Assessing the Direct and Indirect 
Linkages Across Multiple Urban Areas, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 53, 55 (2005) 
(“[R]ecent studies have found that suspect race and demeanor are strong determinants of 
an officer’s decision to use force . . . . This research is consistent with other studies that 
have found police are more likely to use force when the subjects reside in predominately 
black neighborhoods.” (citations omitted)); Gabrielson, Grochowski & Sagara, supra note 
59 (“Young black males in recent years were at far greater risk of being shot dead by police 
than their white counterparts . . . .”). 
59 Brandl & Stoshine, supra note 54, at 555-56. 
60 Id. 




and 7:00 PM to 3:00 AM) compared with the low-rate officers.61 The study 
revealed that officers who use force at “high” rates were generally likely to 
have a relatively high number of complaints against them.62 Such factors can 
be monitored to avoid the same officers repeatedly using excess force. 
Potential risk factors for OIDV include limited personal social 
networks, which are often produced by police officer lifestyle of rotating shifts 
and working on weekends. Other risk factors exist that are inherent in most 
police work: exposure to danger and the stress that it engenders are also 
considered potential risk factors and are also inherent in police work.63 
Researchers also believe that officers exposed to the highest rates of work-
related violence also perpetrate the highest rates of domestic violence, based 
on studies showing a relationship between exposure to violence and personal 
well-being of police officers.64 Surveys identify violence exposure as “one of 
the most significant work related stressors for police,”65 and studies show 
“links between police stress and poor family functioning.”66 Another study 
found that most OIDV perpetrators had been assigned to high crime index 
precincts; in fact, fifty percent of all officers accused of intimate partner 
violence in this particular study came from the top four out of nine districts in 
terms of crime index rates.67 
In addition, elements of police culture such as authoritarianism often 
provide context for research on OIDV. Many theorists believe that the reason 
police officers are more likely to abuse their domestic partners is because they 
are trained to behave in certain ways on the job, training that has the effect of 
making them controlling and violent.68 Officers are trained to develop a 
“command presence.”69 In order to maintain control over situations, they are 
																																								 																				
61 Id. at 558. 
62 Id. at 565. 
63 Erwin et al., supra note 20, at 14; see also PETER FINN & JULIE ESSELMAN TOMZ, NAT’L 
INSTIT. OF JUST., DEVELOPING A LAW ENFORCEMENT STRESS PROGRAM FOR OFFICERS AND 
THEIR FAMILIES 14-15 (1997) (discussing domestic violence as an effect of stress on law 
enforcement officers and identifying “shift work and overtime” as one of multiple sources 
of such stress). 
64 Stinson & Liederbach, supra note 3, at 603. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Erwin et al., supra note 20, at 15. 
68 See, e.g., Robert Sgambelluri, Police Culture, Police Training, and Police Administration: 
Their Impact on Violence in Police Families, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY POLICE OFFICERS 
309, 314-15 (Donald C. Sheehan ed., 2000) (exploring the “authoritarianism, isolation, and 
. . . sense of entitlement” cultivated by police training and linking those traits to domestic 
abuse). 
69 WETENDORF, supra note 7, at 14. 




taught to use verbal commands and intimidation meant to gain acquiescence, 
and/or physical force (punches, kicks, and the use of weapons) when their orders 
are not obeyed.70 Such behaviors used at home constitute a behavioral “spill-
over,”71 in which police officers treat family members as criminal suspects.72 
Job-caused stress, exposure to violence, trauma, and anger also cause 
“spillover.” These factors, which have been shown to lead to on-the-job 
violence, are similar to those that cause intimate partner violence.73 Stress also 
correlates to domestic violence: a recent work stress survey conducted with 
over 1,100 police officer participants showed that intimate partner violence is 
significantly correlated with perceived job-related stress.74 
Researchers point to authoritarianism at home as officers’ mala-
daptive effort to cope with their stress.75 Police officers commonly exhibit a 
personality type called “authoritarian personality,” which social scientists 
characterize as “narrow-minded, violent, and suspicious,” and having “little 
tolerance for those who do not submit to their authority,”76 which causes what 
Johnson calls the “negative spillover of occupational stress” into the intimate 
partner sphere.77 New research, however, suggests that this is not equally the 
case across racial and gender lines in police ranks. A study that explored the 
emotional states and personalities of self-reported OIDV offenders suggested 
that the categories of female and non-white officers are not as subject to 
authoritarian personality spillover as the study’s male and white officer 
																																								 																				
70 Stinson & Liederbach, supra note 3, at 604; see also WETENDORF, supra note 7, at 16 (“In 
the ‘use of force continuum,’ officers are taught to use techniques to incapacitate someone 
without causing death or serious bodily injury. The continuum begins with officer 
presence, verbal direction or commands and ‘soft’ empty-hand techniques (no nightstick, 
pepper spray, or gun), which include applying various holds and pressure points that 
encourage compliance, but within a relatively low threshold of pain. If resistance continues, 
the officer may escalate to ‘hard’ empty-hand techniques, chemical agents, and finally 
toward lethal force with a firearm.”). 
71 Stinson & Liederbach, supra note 3, at 603-04. 
72 Id. 
73 Oehme et al., supra note 8, at 93 (citing Michael Pendleton et al., Stress and Strain Among 
Police, Firefighters, and Government Workers: A Comparative Analysis, 16 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 196 (1989)). 
74 Erwin et al., supra note 20, at 14. 
75 Anita S. Anderson & Celia C. Lo, Intimate Partner Violence Within Law Enforcement 
Families, 26 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1176, 1186 (2011). 
76 Id. at 1178 (citing Robert W. Balch, The Police Personality: Fact or Fiction?, 63 J. CRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY AND POLICE SCI. 106 (1972) and THEODOR W. ADORNO, THE 
AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950)). 
77 Id. (citing Leanor Boulin-Johnson, Burnout and Work and Family Violence Among Police: 
Gender Comparisons, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY POLICE OFFICERS 107 (Donald C. 
Sheehan ed., 2000)). 




categories.78 This suggests that police supervisors have additional criteria, 
namely being male and white, from which to draw inferences about 
authoritarian personalities and their likely future offenses. 
 
III. LEGAL LOGISTICS OF “RAISING THE CURTAIN” 
 
Supervisors should react based on an understanding that violence on 
and off the job stem from the same sources, sources that can be identified and 
targeted. When a supervisor receives a complaint that an officer assaulted his 
partner, that complaint could, in addition to requiring immediate action on that 
count, alert him or her to the probability of both further domestic violence and 
on-the-job excessive use of force.79 
Currently, as Ramirez-Lluveras demonstrates, acts of violence in the 
workplace are not considered clear warning signs of violence in the “private 
sphere”; courts also currently hold that officer-involved domestic violence 
(OIDV) complaints do not evidence that police supervisors should have had 
constructive knowledge that an officer would use excessive force against a 
criminal suspect.80 If further research were to find that police officers who 
committed excessive force were significantly more likely to perpetrate 
domestic violence, and vice versa, it could inform a unified system in which 
any and all violence were considered worthy of putting supervisors on alert. 
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act is the most prominent federal statute 
permitting civil action against police officers, their superiors, and municipalities: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation . . . of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured . . . .81  
																																								 																				
78 Id. at 1187. In this study, “authoritarian spillover” was most highly correlated with OIDV 
for male officers and white officers; but for the female officers and African American 
officers, “negative emotions” were much more highly correlated with OIDV.  Id. This was 
consistent with previous research showing that “female and African American officers are 
more likely to experience ‘emotional burnout,’ an exhaustion and emotional depletion 
attributed to work, than they were to experience ‘depersonalization,’ manifesting in 
impersonal, unsympathetic behavior toward the public.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
79 See Adams, supra note 58, at 9 (“[Research on risk factors] has led many police departments 
to implement early warning systems designed to identify high-risk officers before they become 
major problems. Most of these systems use administrative records, such as disciplinary records 
and citizen complaints, to monitor officer performance for possible problems.”). 
80 Ramirez-Lluveras v. Rivera-Merced, 759 F.3d 10, 18-22 (1st Cir. 2014).  
81 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 




Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, local government entities, including 
cities, counties, and their agencies can be sued in federal court for monetary 
damages. Additionally, the statute enables civil actions against police officers 
who act “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State.”82 Section 1983 does not allow claims based solely on 
respondeat superior,83 but public officials can be liable for situations 
stemming from their own acts or omissions.84 Supervisory liability under § 
1983 requires that the supervisor’s conduct, whether action or inaction, 
constitutes supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence.85 The 
law also attaches supervisory liability based on “deliberate indifference”86 
and municipal liability based on, among other claims, “failure to train.”87 A 
supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if: 
 
the behavior of his subordinates results in a constitutional 
violation, and (2) the supervisor’s action or inaction was 
affirmatively linked to that behavior in the sense that it could 
be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation 
or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate 
indifference.88 
 
The “deliberate indifference” inquiry has a three-part test that requires 
plaintiffs to show: (1) “that the officials had knowledge of facts,” from which 
(2) “the official[s] can draw the inference” (3) “that a substantial risk of serious 
harm exists.”89 
A municipality can be held liable under § 1983 only where the munici-
pality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue since respondeat superior 
and vicarious liability will not attach under this section of the law.90 A plaintiff 
																																								 																				
82 Id. 
83 Respondeat superior is a tort theory, a form of strict liability (legal responsibility not 
requiring proof of fault) where an employer is legally responsible for the actions of her 
employee by virtue of the special relationship that exists between employers and employees. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
84 Russell G. Donaldson, Vicarious Liability of Superior Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for 
Subordinate’s Acts in Deprivation of Civil Rights, 51 A.L.R. FED. 285 (citing Saldivar v. 
Pridgen, 91 F. Supp. 3d 134 (D. Mass 2015)). 
85 Id. (citing Maldonado v. Municipality of Barceloneta, 682 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.P.R. 2010). 
86 Id. (citing Maldonado v. Municipality of Barceloneta, 682 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.P.R. 2010) 
and Pineda v. Tommey, 533 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
87 Id. (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 
88 Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
89 Ramirez-Lluveras v. Rivera-Merced, 759 F.3d 10, 20 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). 
90 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). 




must therefore prove that a policy or custom of the city led to the constitutional 
deprivation alleged.91 Moreover, that policy or custom must amount to 
“deliberate indifference” to the rights of the municipality’s inhabitants.92 The 
Supreme Court addressed the statutory liability in City of Canton v. Harris, 
holding that “failure to train” can be the basis of liability if “the need for more or 
different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in vio-
lation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably 
be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”93 To establish 
municipality liability for failure to train police officers under § 1983, plaintiffs 
must show that the training was in fact inadequate and that the inadequate 
training demonstrates a deliberate indifference toward persons with whom the 
police come into contact.94 
If further research showed a strong connection between excessive force 
and OIDV and courts reacted accordingly, an excessive force complaint 
brought against an officer who has been previously accused of OIDV and his 
supervisor’s subsequent failure to provide adequate re-training and psycho-
logical services, or to adequately discipline that officer, could be seen as 
“deliberate indifference” and supervisory liability under § 1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act could attach.95 Courts interpreting § 1983 broadly would also help 
plaintiffs succeed in excessive-force claims, crucially reinforcing public 
pressure to help curb abusive police practices.96 
 
																																								 																				
91 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 690-94 (1978). 
92 Id. at 388. 
93 Id. at 378; but see Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A pattern of similar 
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate 
deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” (internal citations omitted)). 
94 Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). 
95 See generally Thomas J. Martinelli, Unconstitutional Policing: Part 3–A Failure To Train Is 
Compensable Liability, 82 THE POLICE CHIEF 1 (Nov. 2015). 
96 In particular, the events of Ferguson, Missouri have heightened awareness of ubiquitous, 
abusive police practices, which are tied to the racialized over-criminalization of 
impoverished neighborhoods. See generally Larry Buchanan et al., What Happened in 
Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jRJ1i1; Jason M. Williams, Race 
and Justice Outcomes: Contextualizing Racial Discrimination and Ferguson, 6 RALPH 
BUNCH J. PUB. AFF. 1 (2017). In another highly-publicized case, Officer Michael Slager 
demonstrated the importance of closely monitoring and retraining violent police officers: 
when he shot the unarmed Walter Scott he already had an excessive force complaint on his 
record. See generally Cassandra Vinograd, Walter Scott Shooting: What We Know About 








IV. ENCOURAGING MUNICIPAL RESPONSE AS A PRODUCT OF  
“RAISING THE CURTAIN” 
 
The focus on using § 1983 as a tool stems from the fact that monetary 
damages have been shown to motivate police departments to clarify and update 
their domestic violence policies.97 Holding supervisors and municipalities 
liable for the actions of their subordinates has the following benefits: 1) it 
reaches the parties likely be a making policy; 2) municipalities and supervisors 
are more likely than subordinates to be indemnified by local governments, 
providing them with deep pockets; and 3) a judgment against a supervisor is 
more likely to lead to a change in the municipal culture, customs, practices or 
policies that enabled the challenged conduct.98 
Police departments often compound the problem of OIDV by not 
taking related complaints seriously: 23% of accused officers in one study had 
a history of at least one prior OIDV report on file with the police depart- 
ment and 5% had two or more priors.99 The same study showed that after an 
OIDV complaint, the majority of accused officers, 64%, were immediately 
suspended from duty, 26% had a protection order issued against them, and 
17% were immediately arrested.100 However, the final administrative deci-
sion in an overwhelming majority of cases, 92%, resulted in no action, 
usually because of “lack of testimony or unsupported evidence (61%), lack 
of physical evidence (31%), and conflicting testimony (1%).” Even when the 
use of a lethal weapon was alleged, reports filed against police officers were 
usually dropped.101 
																																								 																				
97 For example, the $2,000,000 awarded in Sorichetti v. New York prompted the New York Police 
Department to initiate a mandatory arrest policy in domestic violence cases. 65 N.Y.2d 461, 463 
(N.Y. 1985); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 140.10 (1999), cited in G. Kristian Miccio, Notes from the 
Underground: Battered Women, the State, and Conceptions of Accountability, 23 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 133, 170-71 (Spring 2000); Lisa Snead, Domestic Violence Litigation in the Wake 
of DeShaney and Castle Rock, 18 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 305, 306 (2009). 
98 See generally Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Congress Needs to Repair the Court's Damage to § 1983, 
16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 29 (2010). 
99 Erwin, et al., supra note 20, at 17. 
100 Id. The data from other studies also suggest that at least initially, officers accused of 
violence toward their intimate partners are treated comparably to civilians similarly accused: 
about 20% of such offenders were initially arrested. Id. (citing RENNISON & WELCHANS, 
supra note 12). 
101 Id. The impact of more stringent departmental policies against OIDV cuts both ways 
regarding reporting, however, with many believing that survivors of OIDV are more likely 
to report when departments demonstrate commitment to addressing complaints, while some 
researchers suggest reporting rates go down when career-ending penalties are likely. Stinson 
& Liederbach, supra note 3, at 604-05. 
 




Separate from the issue of criminal proceedings is how the precinct 
reacts to the complaint and whether it continues to employ such officers in 
positions of power and authority. According to one study, only about one third 
of cases involved officers who were separated from their job either through 
resignation or termination; the majority of cases resulted in suspension.102 
Courts could interrupt this harmful status quo by expecting supervisors to be 
familiar with the vast empirical evidence suggesting that violence of any kind 
is a warning sign. Liability would be imposed on supervisors who failed to 
expect that without intervention their subordinate officer would commit more 
violence in either or both “spheres,” and who failed to respond to their subord-
inate’s violence, no matter the “sphere.” 
In Saldivar v. Pridgen, Plaintiff Elva Saldivar had called the Fall 
River Police Department to report that one of her children was being harassed 
at school. Before being assigned to investigate the complaint, arriving at her 
home, and then assaulting, battering, and raping Ms. Saldivar.103 Officer 
Anthony Pridgen’s disciplinary record already included eleven violations – 
one of which was for improperly informing the victim of her rights and 
inadequately conducting a search for weapons during a domestic violence 
call.104 The District Court in Pridgen replied that evidence of “serious prior 
incidents similar to the alleged constitutional violation” were necessary to 
“put the municipality on . . . notice of an officer’s danger to the public.”105 
The District Court’s decision to grant the motion to dismiss stated that a 
“disciplinary record in the Fall River Police Department consists of 11 
violations between September, 2003 and June, 2011 that are entirely 
unrelated to any form of sexual misconduct”106 would not give the Chief of 
Police constructive knowledge of “even the possibility that [the officer] 
would sexually assault a woman.”107 The First Circuit affirmed.108 The plain-
tiff in Pridgen argued that Police Chief Racine had neglected to institute 
further training, supervision, or discipline for Officer Pridgen as he could 
have and should have done. This inaction, Ms. Saldivar argued, reflected a 
City policy of deliberate indifference, which, in the case of Officer Pridgen, 
led to her rape and assault.109  
																																								 																				
102 Stinson & Liederbach, supra note 3, at 612. 
103 Saldivar v. Pridgen, 91 F. Supp. 3d 134, 136 (D. Mass. 2015). 
104 Id. at 137-38. 
105 Id. at 138 (internal citations omitted). 
106 Id. at 137. 
107 Id. 
108 Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2016). 
109 Saldivar v. Pridgen, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 138. 
 




 Ms. Saldivar argued that the “repetitive decisions to impose suspen-
sions rather than termination of employment reflected a pattern of conduct 
constituting the official and customary policy of the Fall River Police 
Department.”110 The court should have concurred that Officer Pridgen’s prior 
disciplinary record put his supervisor on notice that he had been behaving in a 
problematic way. If someone were tracking officer behavior, his would have 
been identified as symptomatic of underlying stress and likely authoritarian 
personality spillover. Given the fact that social science has consistently linked 
stress to police violence and abuse in both “spheres,” the supervisor should be 
held accountable for failing to recognize Officer Pridgen as the danger to those 
around him. His supervisor’s failure to terminate his employment or even to 
order him to undergo additional training, counseling, or supervision, should 
have been considered deliberate indifference. 
In Ramirez-Lluveras, there was only one year between Officer Pagán’s 
two-month suspension for OIDV and his fatal shooting of Mr. Cáceres.111 
Before the suspension, Officer Pagán continued to work on the police force 
during the eight years it took for a decision to be reached regarding disciplinary 
action for his OIDV.112 The Ramirez-Lluveras court failed to encourage police 
departments to consider a domestic violence complaint as a warning sign for 
excessive force,113 similarly ignoring the social science that has long linked on-
the-job violence with emotional factors such as stress and authoritarianism, the 
same factors highly correlated with off-the-job violence.  
Those courts thus failed to encourage supervisors to focus on officer 
behavior in either environment as symptomatic of an underlying problem. Such 
a focus would then have encouraged police supervisors to address the root 
causes of these two forms of officer violence, both of which are endemic in 
police departments today.114 
																																								 																				
110 Id. at 138. 
111 Ramirez-Lluveras v. Rivera Merced, 759 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 2014) 
112 Id. at 28. 
113 Id. at 19-23. 
114 Section 1983 plaintiffs often establish a constitutional violation and resulting injuries yet are 
still denied damages due to rulings that limit municipal liability. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 
U.S. 51, 51 (2011) (holding one Brady violation insufficient for a failure-to-train claim, making 
it harder to assert failure-to-train claims based on single-incident violations or the theory of 
“obviousness” for the need for training). Following Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), 
which heightened pleading requirements, some circuits now require the plaintiff to show that the 
supervisor possessed discriminatory intent in order to hold the supervisor liable. See Boden-
steiner, supra note 100, at 52-53 (explaining the effect of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on § 1983 actions); 
Sandra T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A]fter Iqbal a plaintiff must also 
show that the supervisor possessed the requisite discriminatory intent.”); but see Starr v. Baca, 
652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012) (holding that plaintiff 




As noted in the Christopher Commission report, “focusing efforts on a 
handful of officers can eliminate roughly one out of seven excessive-force 
incidents.”115 The fact that a small percentage of officers are responsible for a 
disproportionate number of complaints suggests that police supervisors and 
administrators could be well aware of those officers and their behavioral 
issues.116 Excessive-force complaints, especially those arising in the most 
crime-filled patrols, could be viewed as indicators of potential OIDV, and 
complaints of OIDV could be viewed as indicators of potential excessive force. 
Both are likely violent reactions to job-related situational factors, with stress 
becoming a psychological trigger for unacceptable violence.117 
Further research should be done in collaboration with police depart-
ments, in order to gain a more accurate picture of the correlations between 
excessive force and OIDV by individual officers. Yet even with the statistical 
knowledge social science has already provided, courts should hold domestic 
violence complaints in § 1983 excessive-force cases to be indicators that could 
put police supervisors on notice of future excessive force, contrary to the holding 
of Ramirez-Lluveras. This would motivate precincts to seek out domestic 
violence abusers and to thoroughly address OIDV complaints.118 Similarly, if 
contrary to the holding in Pridgen, supervisors were “put on notice” following 
repeated violent misconduct that an officer may perpetrate sexual assault, 
municipalities could be motivated to better train and track officers.  
 
V. TRAINING THAT DECREASES OFFICER VIOLENCE IN BOTH “SPHERES” 
 
According to one survey of police departments serving populations 
over 100,000, only fifty-five percent of the departments had specific policies 
in place for dealing with OIDV.119 There are forms of anger-management and 
																																								 																				
adequately asserted a supervisory liability claim based on a “deliberate indifference” standard that 
does not require discrimiatory intent for supervisory liability); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 
1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that under § 1983, a plaintiff is allowed “to impose 
liability upon a defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, implements, or possesses respon-
sibility for the continued operation of a policy” that abrogates a constitutional right). 
115 Adams, supra note 58, at 9 (citing CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16). 
116 Brandl & Stoshine, supra note 54, at 563. 
117 Id. at 11. 
118 Both domestic violence and on-the-job violence also implicate culture problems; inadequate 
or improper training of police officers is frequently the basis of municipal liability for excessive-
force incidents. LARRY K. GAINES & VICTOR E. KAPPELER, POLICING IN AMERICA 431 (2008). 
119 LARRY BOYD, ET AL., DOMESTIC ASSAULT AMONG POLICE: A SURVEY OF INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS POLICIES 5 (1995), http://www.cailaw.org/media/files/ILEA/Publications/domes 
tic_99.pdf (“[A]t least 45% of the [surveyed] departments have no specific policy guidelines 
for dealing with this issue.”). 




stress-management trainings, including individualized psychology and anger-
prevention modules, that municipalities can implement to decrease police 
violence, in addition to more-stress-conscious shift and patrol rotations.120 
Given that knowledge, supervisors should theoretically be held liable if they 
fail to implement these interventions. 
Some police organizations already make the connection between at-
home and on-the-job violence and disseminate ways to predict violence. For 
example, the New Jersey Domestic Violence Fatality and Near Fatality Board 
of the Department of Children and Families have promulgated a “Model Policy 
On Domestic Violence in the Law Enforcement Community.”121 One section 
is particularly relevant: 
 
VIII. EARLY WARNING AND INTERVENTION 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
A. Department Responsibilities 
1. The department shall either in response to observed  
           warning signs or at the request of an officer, provide  
           non-punitive avenues of assistance to officers, their  
           partners, and other family members before an act of  
           domestic violence occurs. . . . 
 
B. Supervisor Responsibilities 
1. Supervisors shall be aware of and document any pattern  
          of abusive behavior potentially indicative of domestic  
          violence including but not limited to the following: 
                       (a) Aggressiveness 
   (1) Excessive and/or increased use of force on the job.  
   (2) Stalking and inappropriate surveillance activities. 
                    _(3) Unusually high incidences of physical altercations  
                      and verbal disputes.  
                      (4) Citizen and fellow officer complaints of unwar- 
                      ranted aggression and verbal abuse.122 
 
																																								 																				
120 See generally Alexis D. Abernethy & Christopher Cox, Anger Management Training for 
Law Enforcement Personnel, 22 J. CRIM. JUST. 459 (1994). 
121 LAURA CERMINARA ET AL., NEW JERSEY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY AND NEAR 
FATALITY REVIEW BOARD, MODEL POLICY ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE LAW ENFOR-
CEMENT COMMUNITY (2006), http://www.nj.gov/dcf/news/reportsnewsletters/taskforce/Model 
_of_DV_in_LEC_Policy.pdf. 
122 Id. at 8. 




Early warning (EW) systems are already in place in over forty percent 
of all municipal and county law enforcement agencies serving populations 
greater than 50,000 people.123 EW systems use data to pinpoint officers who 
repeated exhibit problematic behavior, enabling supervisors to intervene with 
counseling or training.124 While civilian complaints are often included, EW 
systems should specifically highlight OIDV complaints when tracking 
misconduct likely to signal when intervention is necessary.125 
Identification and evaluation of stress is critical for intervention in 
and prevention of officer-involved domestic violence. Early warning 
systems, which are designed to identify violence-prone officers while reme-
dial interventions are still an option, could be used. These often include 
monitoring civilian complaints and disciplinary records to identify officer 
performance problems, but could also reasonably include monitoring OIDV 
as a specific predictor for officer involvement in use-of-force incidents.126 
Training, psychological review, and appropriate reassignments could be done 
quickly; all these measures would help curb the pervasive intimate partner 
violence among police officers, as well as decrease the likelihood of use of 
excessive force on the job. 
Supervisors should organize programs, encourage self-care, ensure 
more equitable shift and hour rotation, and provide psychological services 
necessary to curb stress and thereby police violence; courts could demand that 
supervisors adapt in light of newly understood psychology and better manage 
the people bestowed with so much power. It should no longer be considered 
reasonable to believe that a sixty-day suspension, without any additional 
retraining or psychological services, would address a police officer’s anger and 
violence issues. 
Supervisors could promote a culture in which the entire precinct looks 
for early warning signs of violence; they could document behavior indicative 
of both domestic violence and excessive force on the job and could penalize 
officers who did not report information regarding domestic violence. Once a 
supervisor has been put “on notice” that an officer may commit further 
violence, either on or off-the-job, there are a variety of ways that supervisors 
can then prevent that outcome. Police departments could mandate that when  
a call is received from a victim of officer-involved domestic violence, for 
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example, an Internal Affairs representative must be sent automatically to the 
scene.127 Officers who attempt to discourage a victim from seeking help, or 
who interfere with domestic violence cases, intimidate, or coerce witnesses or 
victims, could be subject to criminal charges and disciplined.128 
Courts could help change police norms by rejecting the still-utilized 
concept of “public” and “private” “spheres,”129 and demanding that both 
excessive-force and OIDV complaints put police supervisors on notice of 
potential future violence, signaling the need for intervention. If either form of 
violence [re]occurs, supervisory liability should attach under § 1983. By 
expecting police supervisors to understand the connections between stress and 
violence, and holding them responsible for failing to respond appropriately, 
courts could also encourage more mental-health-conscious police departments 




The historical legal division between “private” and “public” “spheres” 
still exists within some aspects of domestic violence law, and results in police 
officer domestic violence being seen as separate and unconnected to on-the-
job excessive force. Police departments should actively address the “code of 
silence” culture and provide training on stress management, anger manage-
ment, and avoidance of violent and abusive conduct in order to curb both types 
violence.130 Further research should be done—ideally with police department 
collaboration—to verify that police officers who commit domestic violence or 
excessive force are more likely to have the other type of violence in their 
records. This would involve gathering files on officers with excessive violence 
complaints and cross-referencing them with references to OIDV in order to 
produce accurate results as to how much overlap exists. 
With that information, rather than treating domestic violence claims as 
separate from the supervisory and municipal liability calculus, courts could 
incentivize police departments to treat intimate partner violence as a predictor 
of future excessive and unlawful physical intimidation, and terminate the 
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officer if the internal review finds fault; likewise, after excessive force com-
plaints, supervisors could be on notice that failing to re-training that officer 
they make them liable for civil rights abuses. Such a course of action would 
constitute raising the curtain between the traditionally observed public and 
private “spheres,” and could both curb excessive-force incidents and decrease 
the high rate of intimate partner violence in police families. 
 
 
 
